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THE CONSUMMATE LEGAL EDUCATION: TEACHING ANALYSIS AS DOCTRINE 
 
Julie Ann Interdonato* 
 
 This Article addresses the necessity and means of developing 
analysis and its written expression as an independent topic of study 
throughout students’ law school tenure. “Doctrine,” as it appears in the 
above title, is defined as the transcendent analytic concepts that underlie 
the common law, and the modality of their application in the law’s constant 
evolution. The purpose of presenting analysis in this context is to enhance 
analytic instruction presently provided in law school, and thereby take 
students one step further in their education, into the realm of the practicing 
attorney. In this manner, educators, building on the case law method, 
maximize students’ sophisticated, lawyerly thinking to the degree the 
practicing bar demands of recent graduates seated at their desks as new 
professionals. 
 Only in the scholastic environment is there the capacity to devote 
both time and purpose exclusively to detailed, continual, analytic training. 
In this context, professors assume the role of both teacher and senior 
partner, at once playing devil’s advocate, and sharing their own thought 
processes as experienced professionals. Instruction necessarily runs 
concurrently with that of the traditional law school courses, thereby 
enhancing student aptitude in every area of legal study, and engendering a 
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 Imagine that a law school finds itself uncommonly short of faculty 
on the eve of the fall semester. The school thus decides that it must 
eliminate all courses of instruction but one for the entire year. It then calls a 
meeting of the student body, at which it disseminates a list of all the 
doctrinal courses comprising the traditional law school curriculum for well 
over a century. A panel of administrators, including the dean, then asks the 
students to suggest, for its consideration, which of those courses should be 
chosen as the one and only. Many of the students, frustrated and angry at 
the turn of events, refuse to so much as contemplate the prospect. Some 
form factions, based upon what course they believe to be the best choice, 
and those factions fight amongst themselves, all to the dismay of the 
observing panel. Finally, one first-year student calmly and confidently 
raises her hand. The dean, relieved by what he perceives as a gesture of 
cooperation, acknowledges the student: 
“Yes, what doctrinal course would you choose?” 
“I choose Analytic Doctrine,” she replies. 
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 A thud of silence befalls the auditorium, except for a hint of muffled 
laughter emanating from a location uncertain.  
“I’m afraid there is no such entry on the list,” says the dean, 
judging his perception of the student’s intentions to have 
been erroneous. “Perhaps,” he suggests diplomatically, 
“because this is only your first year, you do not yet 
appreciate the significance of the time-honored curriculum.” 
“But I do, Sir,” the student explains. “If, however, we may 
benefit from only one topic of study, should it not be the one 
that enables us to comprehend all the others?” 
 Bereft of counter-argument, the panel seeks to oblige. 
 
 In the actual world, the circumstances are quite the opposite. The 
traditional curriculum substantially remains, and so it should; however, 
what lies at its core goes largely unacknowledged through the decades. 
Though analysis per se underlies every subject presented in law school, and 
is the gateway to all lawyerly training, its individual role in the curriculum 
is all too often abridged, or non-existent.1 Thus, the full significance of 
analysis is understated in the minds of the students, whose future employers 
nonetheless will expect them to enter the world with professional abilities.2 
Without a separate and pronounced focus on analysis in and of itself, the 
law school education, fine as it is, falls short of its great potential. 
 Absent specifically is the articulation of legal analysis as doctrine, 
and its rigorous, repeated instruction as a proper, independent course of 
study throughout a student’s law school career. Doctrine is defined herein 
as the transcendent analytic concepts that underlie the common law, and the 
modality of their application in the law’s constant evolution.3 However 
abstract, these concepts, because of their time-honored universality in the 
common law system, are nonetheless etched in stone. They are the vehicle 
that enables the student, and the lawyer, to understand and apply the law to 
                                                 
1 See infra notes 22, 33 and accompanying text (addressing deficiencies in analytic 
training). 
2 See infra pp.6–8 (describing the analytic demands placed upon graduates). 
3 See infra Sections I(A), I(C)–(D) (providing a rudimentary discussion of analytic 
methodology, a sampling of analytic concepts reflected in court decisions, and the role 
these concepts play in application of common law precedent). 
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diverse facts, in perpetuation of the role of the common law as a living, 
developing entity. 
 When Christopher Langdell introduced the case law method at 
Harvard in 1870,4 the prevailing law school instruction was based upon the 
Dwight Method.5 Under this approach, preparation for law school class 
entailed reading treatises, as opposed to actual court decisions.6 Professors 
conducted classes by lecture, and students were tested orally on their ability 
to memorize.7 Langdell’s presentation necessarily viewed law in the context 
of the judicial decisions in which it appeared,8  and undisputedly brought to 
light the foundation of law school education recognized in the present day. 
Yet, that presentation represented something far greater, but largely 
unexplored: the pathway to the intrinsic case law analysis essential to the 
practicing attorney. How ironic, therefore, that case law analysis, and all it 
encompasses, is insufficiently addressed in the very system upon which it is 
based. 
 The cause of this irony originates in the historical underpinnings of 
formal legal education. Before Langdell’s emergence at Harvard, would-be 
lawyers did not necessarily attend law school. Education in the law was 
achieved by means of: (1) self-study; (2) an apprenticeship in a law 
practice; (3) formal study within an independent school or a university; or 
                                                 
4 See W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1997) (providing 
a detailed account of emergence of the case law method in the context of development of 
formalized legal education). 
5 David A. Garvin, Making the Case: Professional Education for the World of Practice, 




8 See Carter, supra note 4, at 5–6. Professor Carter’s paper refutes a popular opinion that 
Langdell was, in actuality, a formalist; meaning, despite his introduction of a legal 
education system based upon the study of case law, Langdell adhered to the unyielding 
letter of the law, to the exclusion of all else, including morality. Id. at 6, 8, 136. Professor 
Carter proposes that Langdell, instead, was likely as enlightened as he could be for his 
time, during which, law, as even a course of study in colleges and universities, was the 
subject of controversy in the United States, among practitioners and educators alike. Id. at 
136. There is no dispute today, whatever ideology one ascribes to Langdell, that current 
law students must be schooled in learning law in the broader, pivotal context of court 
decisions, and not confine their studies to a blind search for the rule. See infra note 33 and 
accompanying text. The present concern thus is that schooling in case law analysis be 
maximized to the degree necessary to ready students for entry into the profession, as 
addressed herein throughout. 
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(4) some combination.9 Law school faculty generally consisted of 
experienced practitioners who taught part-time.10 Gradually, the case law 
method came into increasing prominence,11 and law schools, with the 
formalized education they provided, played an increasingly greater role in 
gaining entrance into the profession.12 As law schools achieved more 
footing, political power plays for authority in legal education grew between 
the practicing bar on the one hand, and law school institutions on the 
other.13 Law school graduates, devoted for the most part to teaching and 
scholarship, and schooled in the case law method, eventually became the 
dominant figures in legal education, with experienced practitioners playing 
a minority role.14 A pronounced line of demarcation, present to this day, 
thus formed between the practicing bar and the law school, creating two 
separate and distinct entities,15 despite the fact that both entities share the 
same profession, and the same academic core.  
 The law school’s emergence into prominence was unquestionably of 
great benefit to the legal profession, in terms of the uniformity in quality of 
training it ultimately came to represent, combined with implementation of 
the case law method of instruction essential to study of the common law. 
The artificial rift created, however, between the practice of law and its 
inherent academics, has deprived students of the full extent of analytic 
training the profession demands of a beginning lawyer. To engage in a 
thorough analysis of case law, and, from that analysis, to assess the merits 
of a course of action or formulate a legal argument, is indeed the academics 
of law, as well as the requirement of every practitioner. That misconceived 
line of demarcation, extant well over a century ago, was the product of the 
politics of the time and the early growing stages of formal legal education, 
but has no legitimate basis in the present. In the interest of providing law 
students with the best fundamental education possible, that line must be 
lifted sufficiently to allow full training in the analytic process into the law 
school classroom. 
                                                 
9 Carter, supra note 4, at 11. 
10 Id. at 13.  
11 See id. at 37–38. 
12 See id. at 36. 
13 Id. at 3, 104–06.    
14 See id. at 106–07. 
15 See id. at 94–113. 
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 A poignant example of the effect of history and politics upon the 
selection of courses provided in law school is the once treatment of 
constitutional law. In his 1870–1871 annual report to Harvard alumni, Dean 
Langdell, in enumerating the legal topics of study taught at Harvard, 
omitted constitutional law from the list.16 Law school, at the time, did not 
constitute the relatively pluralistic institution that it does today. Thus, 
“neither [Langdell], nor the overwhelming majority of his students, nor 
their potential clients, expected to have any need to look to the Constitution 
for the protection of their rights.”17 Yet, the United States Constitution is 
the “supreme Law of the Land.”18 Consequently, much of the students’ 
view of the law is, expressly or impliedly, through the lens of constitutional 
principles, and in the context of a framework of government the 
Constitution itself provides. By analogy, analytic doctrine governs all legal 
study. Students’ insight is necessarily achieved through the lens of analytic 
concepts, which inherently govern the continual development of judicial 
precedent. These concepts ever guide students’ thinking, throughout the law 
school experience and their entire professional lives.    
 To relegate, therefore, the unabridged study of analysis to the 
“practical” world, and omit to address it as a course of study in academia, is 
to send graduates on their way without as complete an education as can and 
must be had, in each individual area of the law school curriculum. Under 
such circumstance, students of all levels of aptitude walk away with 
insufficient exposure to the degree of analytic training potentially, and 
uniquely, available in the scholastic setting. In that setting, there is the 
capacity to devote both time and purpose exclusively to detailed, continual 
analytic instruction. This instruction necessarily would run concurrently 
with the case readings and class discourse taking place in the remaining 
courses, thereby enhancing student aptitude overall. All legal educators 
must be encouraged to work within that specific paradigm of education to 
                                                 
16 See id. at 26. The courses of study listed were “Real Property, Contracts, Torts, Criminal 
Law and Criminal Procedure, Civil Procedure at Common Law, Evidence, and Jurisdiction 
and Procedure in Equity.” Id. 
17 Carter, supra note 4, at 127. Constitutional law was taught previously at Harvard, 
however. Id. at 127 n.413. In the list of courses provided for the subsequent school year, 
1871–1872, constitutional law was included again, but only as an elective. Id. at 26, n.102. 
18 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
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raise the bar of analytic acumen for future generations of lawyers, and not 
remain content with maintenance of the status quo. 
 Moreover, graduates, who enter the profession as novices, must 
understand that a significant job of lawyers is to develop an academic 
mastery of the law substantially beyond what they learn within the 
inevitable confines of formal education. That mastery is challenged in 
several contexts, including the lawyer’s substantive ability to: counsel a 
client; draft an agreement; conduct or defend a deposition; try a case; 
present an argument, both written and oral, before a panel of judges; and, 
indeed, serve as judge in the first instance, or assume the role of judge to 
assess the merits of both sides of a position. In every one of these instances, 
the professional’s principal asset is analytic training.  
 Still further, beyond classroom, law office, and courthouse, changes 
of monumental consequence are taking place in internet technology, and the 
threat of terrorist activity looms large in the societal consciousness. These 
ever-increasing concerns continually challenge application of traditional 
legal tenets, such as those of tort,19 Fourth Amendment boundaries of 
government investigation,20 and overall Fifth Amendment right to due 
                                                 
19 See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 219–35 
(2001) (addressing the role of tort principles in cases of wrongs committed in the 
relentlessly developing, intangible world of cyberspace). 
20 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). In Jones, officers attached a GPS device 
to the car that defendant drove, without benefit of a proper warrant. Id. at 403. The 
Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the use of the device to track 
defendant’s movements constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, thereby triggering the requisite constitutional safeguards. Id. at 402; see U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. The Court, applying a traditional physical trespass analysis, held a 
search to have taken place. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–06. The issue, however, raised further 
questions, in the minds of the concurring Justices, relative to the constitutionality of 
electronic searches regardless of the applicability of the physical trespass analysis. Id. at 
413–31 (Sotomayor, J. & Alito, J., concurring). These Justices expressed concern that the 
seemingly limitless, ubiquitous nature of modern technology, as an investigatory tool, may 
result in violation of an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and thereby 
constitute a search within the meaning of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). Id. At the same time, the concurrence also observed that the 
growing presence and sophistication of technological advancement would have the effect 
of “shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations,” Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J. 
concurring), in a manner that limits what individuals reasonably consider private in the first 
instance. Justice Scalia, writing the majority opinion, articulated, in dicta, the difficulty of 
determining whether a search has taken plae, based upon the more abstract reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis. Id. at 412–13. Does a two-day visual surveillance, in a 
public place, of an individual suspected of selling stolen goods, fall within the definition of 
search, while a similar six-month surveillance of a suspected terrorist falls outside? In other 
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process of law.21 Society will turn to future generations of lawyers to 
confront these unprecedented challenges and more, as counselors, 
advocates, judges, and educators, imposing a heavy burden upon their 
shoulders. All the heavier thus is the burden upon present members of this 
profession to ensure that these future lawyers are up to the task, and the 
shouldering of this burden begins with educators. Indeed, today’s practicing 
attorneys are placing a pronounced emphasis upon a law school’s ability to 
produce graduates better prepared for entry into the profession, in terms of 
critical thinking and overall analysis.22 It therefore behooves law schools, 
in furtherance of such end, to maintain, at the forefront of their curriculum, 
that which lies at the core of legal education, and to do so for the full tenure 
of the student’s law school experience.  
 The thinking that follows herein is from the combined perspectives 
of an experienced legal practitioner and educator. These perspectives are 
inextricably linked, based upon that common analytic core that both 
practitioners and educators share. To the extent both can be isolated, 
however, the practitioner’s perspective provides an appreciation of the 
depth of analytic insight essential to the function of a lawyer. Accordingly, 
such perspective focuses on the analytic foundation that can and must be 
                                                                                                                            
words, can the definition of the word “search” ever be narrowed or expanded to 
accommodate government investigation, based upon “the nature of the crime being 
investigated,” and what we perceive to be the level of threat to public welfare? Such, he 
observed, is a problem with which the Court “may have to grapple“ in the future. Id;see 
also United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (holding government access 
to cell phone location data of robbery suspect to constitute search, but expressly reserving 
from consideration information gathering “involving foreign affairs and national security”). 
Indeed, the task of grappling with these critical issues likely awaits students presently 
enrolled in law school. 
21 See generally ROGER DOUGLAS, LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF TERRORISM (2014) 
(addressing counterterrorism law and, inter alia, its effect on rights of accused in five 
democratic countries, including the United States). 
22 See Catherine H. Finn & Claudia Diamond, Are We Listening?, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2015, 
at 27, https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january 
-2015-taking-the-stand.cfm. Said article is based upon a survey, consisting of practitioners 
and judges, which revealed “[o]verwhelmingly, the number one skill that [the] respondents 
believe[d] recent graduates lacked was critical thinking and analysis.” Id. at 30. The article 
further articulates the necessity of such ability, in drafting a brief, to apply equally to 
“drafting a will or contract or advising the chief executive officer of a corporation.” Id.; see 
also Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the 
Cognitive Components of the Analytical Mind, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 413, 420, 436–37 
(2007) [hereinafter Gantt] (addressing findings of analytic deficiencies in the minds of 
second and third-year law students). 
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laid in law school. It is upon this foundation that the student may build after 
graduation, in furtherance of meeting maximum professional standards. The 
educator’s voice, in turn, articulates what is meant herein by analytic 
training in the common law system, in the most fundamental sense, and its 
mode of instruction in formalized education, complete with examples. 
 The intended audience of this paper, however, is not limited to 
educators. Rather, it extends to the entire legal profession. So that, founded 
on our cumulative awareness, we all may work together to influence the 
unending betterment of law school education, to the benefit of all students 
who follow, and, thus, the benefit of our society. 
 In furtherance of such end, this paper, specifically: addresses the 
essence of analytic training;23 pinpoints ways in which it is generally 
lacking in the present student curriculum;24 illustrates its unique 
significance to all law school learning, in the context of academic acumen,25 
as well as passion for the law, maturity in judgment, and legal ethics;26 and 
proposes tangible means by which it may be elevated to the prominence it 
deserves in the classic law school education, generally,27 as well as in the 
context of specialized model instruction in the first year,28 and each year 
thereafter.29 This author respectfully submits that development of legal 
education in this regard shall significantly contribute to the optimal 
enhancement of the academic excellence that had its beginning with the 
introduction of the case law method. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Instruction in the Essence of Lawyerly Thinking 
 The courses we normally label “doctrinal,” such as contracts, torts, 
property, and civil procedure, focus on specific areas of the law. This 
category of doctrine is referred to as the “subject courses” for the purpose of 
this paper. Just as analytic doctrine, subject courses play an essential role in 
legal education. While, however, subject courses largely teach students 
what we think about the law, analytic doctrine teaches them how we think 
about the law. In other words, instruction in analytic doctrine delineates 
                                                 
23 See infra Section I(A). 
24 See infra Section I(B). 
25 See infra Sections I(C)–(D). 
26 See infra Sections III(A)–(B). 
27 See infra Section II(A). 
28 See infra Section II(B)(1). 
29 See infra Section II(B)(2). 
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precisely how the lawyer gets from Point A, to Point B, to Point C, and 
beyond, with all shades of gray in between, by applying those unchanging 
analytic concepts that underlie the common law. Such is why the relevance 
of analytic doctrine transcends the boundaries of any one legal subject.  
Indeed, it is the principal vehicle by which a legal subject evolves.  
 In the simplest of terms, the goal of analysis in the common law 
system is to examine a court decision, which is necessarily founded upon 
specific facts, and then predict, with some degree of likelihood, how that 
same court would decide, based upon diverse facts. The lawyer 
accomplishes this goal by first identifying the analytic concepts reflected, 
expressly or impliedly, in the actual text of the court’s decision. Segments 
of the text of a decision, to the extent they reflect analytic concepts, are 
hereinafter referred to as the “analytic components” of case law. A prime 
example of an analytic component is a court’s statement of the procedural 
history of a case. The procedural rules may vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, and may change with the passage of time; however, the 
underlying concept of judicial authority, and the parameters of that 
authority in the decision-making process, remain constant in the common 
law, play a dominant role in its substantive significance, and thus, in 
analysis overall.30  
 In furtherance of the analytic goal, the lawyer then applies the 
relevant analytic components to the new fact pattern to perform an 
extrapolation and arrive at a conclusion regarding the likely judicial 
disposition. The lawyer applies the same basic method in devising an 
argument, except from the perspective of advocate, with the court as the 
ultimate audience. The approach, in each case, is step by deliberate step, 
and within a given conceptual framework31 that varies based upon the 
subject and the problem involved. Thus, instruction in analytic doctrine 
assists the student in identifying and applying each relevant analytic 
component in all its underlying aspects. It then guides the student in the 
analytic journey from one step to another, toward a conclusion, always 
keeping the student focused on how those steps fit within that conceptual 
framework. Founded on this basic approach, students then gradually expand 
                                                 
30 See infra Sections I(B)–(C) (addressing the substantive significance of the procedural 
component, along with that of other analytic components). 
31 See infra Section I(C)(5) (discussing the meaning of “conceptual framework” and its 
significance to the analytic process). 
78 THE CONSUMMATE LEGAL EDUCATION Vol. 4 
 
 
their perspective to: synthesis of multiple court decisions, with continued 
sensitivity to relevant analytic components; integration of diverse opinion 
that may influence the same issue; and overall development of their work, to 
stretch the full, substantive scope of the analytic task before them, in 
furtherance of sophisticated, lawyerly thinking. 
 Inherent in instruction in the subject courses is certainly analysis, 
primarily through the Socratic method. Invaluable though this instruction is, 
it does not provide a sufficient forum for continual and particularized 
analysis in how a court arrives at its determination. Time constraints, and 
the need to focus on the details of a specific legal topic, generally preclude 
such instruction of analysis per se in the subject courses. Nonetheless, to 
understand thoroughly the significance of case precedent addressed in any 
class, students must take the same analytic journey as the court, ever 
mindful of the analytic components that form the basis of a court decision, 
and that lead them toward improved insight into the law.  
 Instruction in analytic doctrine embraces the same Socratic 
discourse; but it places the ultimate focus on the substantive significance of 
specific analytic components for their own sake, and the role those 
components play in application of the law to the facts of a given 
hypothetical, in any legal context. Through that discourse, analytic doctrine 
thus takes students yet one step further in their education, into the realm of 
practicing attorneys. Those attorneys must possess an acute sensitivity to 
what the law means, in the context of each substantive aspect, to achieve an 
in-depth, detailed formulation of their position, as well as a comparable 
command of that of their opponent.  
 It is thus crucial to analytic instruction that professors integrate, into 
the Socratic discourse, their own thought processes employed in striving to 
master a legal problem. In such manner, students have the full benefit of 
their professor’s seasoned, professional experience. Indeed, Langdell 
himself is believed to have embraced teaching law from “the standpoint of 
the learner.”32 Such philosophy should be espoused as an all-encompassing 
approach to instruction, as both student and professor are learners in their 
never-ending pursuit of understanding in the common law. A suggested 
teaching approach, therefore, which encompasses both Socratic dialogue 
and the express sharing of the professor’s own analytic journey, is for the 
                                                 
32 Carter, supra note 4, at 50 (emphasis added). 
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professor to assume the role of senior partner and the students that of junior 
associate. In this context, the senior partner/professor plays devil’s 
advocate, and, at the same time, provides students a guiding legal hand, in 
furtherance of their mutual challenge to create a cogent, rich, professional 
analysis. The varied contexts in which that approach is applied follow infra 
throughout. 
B.  The Necessity of Repetitive, Substantive Application 
 Every law student, regardless of advancement level, can enumerate 
at least some of the analytic components of a case. If one asks a class of 
aspiring lawyers to define summary judgment (a significant aspect of the 
procedural component), or to define dictum, many a student will rise to the 
occasion and recite the litany. A superficial grasp of a definition, however, 
is not the same as the ability to recognize the actual component in a court 
decision, grasp its substantive significance in the context in which it 
appears, and recognize the role it plays in applying the law to a new set of 
facts. However well-versed in definitions, when reading a case, students 
generally focus on one aspect of the text alone, i.e., what is broadly 
categorized as the “holding.” This focus is almost to the exclusion of all 
else. If they emerge victorious with what they believe to be the law for 
which the case stands, they consider themselves to have achieved a 
satisfactory grasp of the court’s decision.33 But a legal education based 
solely upon identification of “line and rule,”34 is in direct contravention to 
the case law method, by its very meaning. In focusing on the holding above 
all else, students unwittingly overlook other analytic components that 
underlie the law of the case and place it in its proper context. They thereby 
preclude themselves from full application of the law to a diverse fact 
                                                 
33See Gantt, supra note 22, at 420. Professor Gantt’s paper pinpoints students’ learning 
throughout law school to focus generally on the rules, to the exclusion of emphasis upon 
other aspects of a lawyer’s thinking. So narrow is this focus that they “fail to develop their 
skills in applying those rules within an analytical framework.” Id. 
34 1 Leigh Hunt, Fiction and Matter of Fact, in MEN, WOMEN, AND BOOKS: A SELECTION 
OF SKETCHES, ESSAYS, AND CRITICAL MEMOIRS 1, 4 (1847). “There are two worlds; the 
world that we can measure with line and rule, and the world that we can feel with our 
hearts and imaginations. To be sensible of the truth of only one of these, is to know truth 
but by halves.” Id. Though the author was not addressing the study of law, the distinction 
he draws plays a poignant role in legal education. To have a command only of rules is 
indeed to know law by only halves, if at all. To have, as well, a finely honed sensitivity to 
the underlying analytic components that govern the application of those rules, and thus an 
ability to think beyond rigid confines, is part and parcel of a capable attorney. 
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pattern. A lack of appreciation of the full, dimensional meaning of an actual 
court decision situates students an insufficient distance from the olden days 
of readings confined to treatises. 
 From that distance, students may develop additional insight beyond 
the holding over time, by their continued participation in the education 
process; however, just as we do not leave students’ grasp of the basic tenets 
taught in the subject courses to the haphazard passage of time, or experience 
in the outside world, neither should we so leave their grasp of analytic 
doctrine. Instruction in furtherance of said development must be express, 
commensurate with the level of academic advancement, and ingrained as an 
integral part of the students’ thinking. Schools ideally should strive to 
maintain mandatory courses in analytic doctrine, alongside the subject 
courses, each year of the students’ law school tenure. This structure creates 
the maximum opportunity for a synergy of learning, based upon the subject 
courses, on the one hand, and analytic doctrine, on the other. The synergy is 
formed when faculty from both sides, working independently, though in 
concert, sharpen simultaneously students’ analytic acumen, as the students 
gradually develop the keen mind of a lawyer.35 
 Absent this synergy, students likely advance from one year to the 
next with, for example, insufficient sensitivity to: a court’s articulation of 
the standard or test applied in arriving at the case holding; the reasoning 
utilized and how reasoning affects future interpretation and application of 
that holding; and how the procedural context in which an issue appears 
before the appellate court affects what the case truly represents in the law. 
Regarding this last shortcoming, if one asks a class whether a trial on the 
merits took place in the lower court or a motion for summary judgment, the 
same students, so adept at reciting definitions, all too often hesitate. Such, at 
least in part, is because class readings generally focus on appellate court 
decisions, leaving students with only a vague awareness of the fact that an 
entire other proceeding took place below and of the substantive nature of 
that proceeding. Yet, as addressed herein, the procedural history of a case 
dictates its very substance, because how an issue arrives before the court 
determines the ambit of the court’s authority to decide.36 Why then would 
all legal educators not want students to view the law in its procedural 
                                                 
 35 See infra Section II(A) (discussing specifics regarding analytic training in the context of 
the overall law school curriculum and the creation of synergy). 
36 See supra Section I(A); see also infra Section I(C)(2).  
2019 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW 81 
 
context. It is therefore incumbent upon legal academia to take greater strides 
in placing that holding, along with other pertinent components of a case, 
continually in its proper context, in furtherance of honing, in the minds of 
students, an instinctive, meaningful, and constantly progressive insight into 
what they are studying.  
C.  Some Rudimentary Specifics 
 At the heart of progressive instruction in analytic doctrine, therefore, 
is an intrinsic, ever-increasingly advanced delving into the role that each 
analytic component plays in the common law. Articulation of the full depth 
and breadth of study of the substantive significance of every cognizable 
analytic component, and legal analysis overall, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. So crucial is intense study of these components, however, that at 
least some of particular import deserve special mention herein, as modest 
illustration. Below thus is discussion regarding limited, rudimentary 
instruction in selected analytic components, as impetus toward in-class 
presentation and ultimate insightful class dialogue, upon which the 
professor may build. Though each of these components is presented in 
isolation, students need understand that the boundaries between and among 
them are generally shaded. One or more may overlap with, or encompass, 
others, as part of one, cohesive judicial text. The achievement of such 
sophisticated understanding is, after all, inherent in the goal of analytic 
instruction.  
 An effective design for crafting written assignments is to create a 
problem that requires students to focus on one analytic component in 
isolation, in addition to a generalized analytic focus. In this manner, the 
seed of appreciation of the substantive significance of that isolated 
component is better implanted in the students’ memory for future 
development. The professor may take the same approach in the context of 
additional assignments, each time with particularized focus on application 
of yet another analytic component, and how each component necessarily 
connects with the whole.37   
 1. The Pivotal Role of Reasoning. Where application of the 
law of a case is in controversy, assessment of whether a proposed resolution 
is in conformity with the underlying reasoning of the law, or in 
                                                 
37 See infra Sections II(B)(1)–(2) (discussing assignments). 
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contravention thereto, is likely the deciding factor. Inculcated thus in the 
students’ minds must be the varied, subtle, and pivotal role reasoning plays 
in the common law. In addition to serving as the principal conduit in 
application of the law to a specific set of facts, reasoning exposes the bigger 
picture in terms of, inter alia, the fairness, morality, and policy concerns 
potentially underlying an entire body of law, as well as the balance of those 
concerns. Societal interests may alter with outside forces that emerge with 
time, and the balance of those interests may shift more heavily on one side 
than the other, because of those forces, but the concept of reasoning and its 
role in the common law remain constant.38   
 Reasoning also is at the core of the relationship between common 
law and statutory law. It assists students in better understanding how those 
two forms of law work together, as well as the complex dynamic that has 
evolved between them.39  A prime illustration of the influence of reasoning 
upon the living law thus lies in the context of a statutory problem. The 
reasoning underlying a statute generally sets the parameters for judicial 
interpretation and application. In special cases, however, that very 
reasoning can prompt a court to decide in a manner that effectively amends 
that statutory provision, or to apply the statute in seeming contravention to 
the statutory language. In such respect, judicial decisions sometimes 
become a springboard for legislative revision, effectively turning an old 
statute on its ear.40 Among analytic components, reasoning invariably reigns 
supreme. 
                                                 
38 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging role technological advancements play in “shaping the evolution of societal 
privacy expectations” in context of Fourth Amendment safeguards). These advancements 
thereby potentially alter the balance of interests between preservation of the right of the 
individual and public safety, based upon the individual’s lesser expectation of privacy. See 
generally supra note 20 (discussing Jones). 
39 See, e.g., Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427 (1969) (creating, in a 
four-to-three decision, an exception to New York’s statute of limitations and arguably 
overstepping judicial authority). Both majority and dissenting opinions raised informative 
questions regarding the respective roles the court and legislature play in the lawmaking 
process, and the sometimes shadowy boundaries of control between those two entities. See 
id. at 435–45 (Breitel, J., dissenting).  
40 See id. The New York Court of Appeals case of Flanagan effectively carved out a 
foreign object exception to New York’s statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
actions, where literally no such statutory language was present. See id. at 431. In 1969, the 
statute provided that the limitation period be measured from the time of the commission of 
the alleged misconduct. See id. at 430. It contained no provision to cover instances in 
which objects, such as surgical clamps, were negligently left inside the patient at the close 
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 2. The Substantive Influence of Procedure.41 The significance, 
and overall reach, of the law that students glean from a case must be viewed 
in a substantive context that is necessarily dictated by the procedural roots. 
The professor must direct students to be closely aware of the relevant 
proceeding that took place before the trial level court in reading every 
appellate case assigned in every course contained in the curriculum. In other 
words, far beyond the distilled appellate court holding, students’ focus must 
be unremittingly on whether the ultimate appellate determination of the case 
is rooted, inter alia, in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
motion for summary judgment, or in a full trial on the ultimate merits. Only 
repeated, uninterrupted practice in sensitivity to procedure results in a 
substantive command of what the law of the case is truly about. 
 From a subtler perspective, students must comprehend that, inherent 
in any decision, is the court’s assessment of whether a given aspect of a 
case rests upon a question of law, or a question of fact, regardless of 
whether the court expressly so articulates. Such distinction between law and 
fact may have profound analytic significance in an advocacy setting, and is 
inextricably linked with the procedural posture of a case.  
 Suppose, for example, that half a class of students is asked to 
imagine it represents a plaintiff in tort, and the other half, the defendant. 
The students for defendant move for summary judgment, pre-discovery, 
dismissing the suit.42 In support of the motion, they cite, as binding 
authority, an appellate decision affirming a lower court judgment against a 
plaintiff who asserted a similar claim and alleged set of facts. That lower 
court judgment, however, is rendered after trial.  
                                                                                                                            
of surgery, though the patient could not have known of their wrongful presence until after 
the limitations period had expired. See id. at 431. Specifically, Flanagan held that, in 
foreign object cases, the limitations period be measured from the time the patient 
reasonably could have discovered the object, instead of from the time that the alleged 
misconduct occurred. Id. In so holding, the Court relied, in large part, upon the precise 
reasoning underlying the statute in the first instance, i.e., concern for loss of evidence and 
break in the causal chain, due to passage of time, as well as frivolous lawsuits. Id. at 429–
31. The exception, in cases involving a foreign object, the majority reasoned, raises none of 
those concerns, as the very presence of the object speaks for itself.  Id. The statute was 
subsequently revised to include a foreign object exception. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. §214-a 
(McKinney 2003). 
41 See also supra Sections I(A)–(B) (addressing the significance of procedure to analytic 
instruction). 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
84 THE CONSUMMATE LEGAL EDUCATION Vol. 4 
 
 
 One argument of students for plaintiff may be that the plaintiff, in 
the cited case, had the full benefit of his day in court: a trial of the facts, 
wherein the plaintiff had an opportunity to demonstrate his own credibility 
and defendant’s lack thereof, and likely the advantage of the complete 
panoply of discovery pre-trial. So too, the student-plaintiffs would argue, 
should the plaintiff at bar. That the plaintiff in the case cited may have lost 
based upon the factual lack of merit of his individual claim has no bearing 
on the singular merits of the claim of the hypothetical plaintiff, no matter 
how similar the nature of the case. Factors, such as the admissibility and 
cogency of specific items of evidence, and, specifically, the overall 
credibility of witnesses, inherently influence the outcome at the trial stage.43 
In so arguing, students for plaintiff must have sufficient substantive 
command of the standard for summary judgment to identify expressly 
where genuine disputes of material fact lie in their case.44 Moreover, the 
students’ argument must incorporate the deference the law affords to their 
client as the non-moving party, with an understanding of the specific factors 
to which that deference applies; mere articulation of words, without specific 
substantive focus, is insufficient.45 
 The students’ total grasp of the procedural significance of their 
position, in the above hypothetical, thus entails: an understanding of the 
procedural history that governs the case at bar and the case cited by their 
adversary; the ability to contrast the two; the insight to use that contrast as a 
basis for argument in opposition to summary judgment; the depth of 
comprehension to support that argument with specific identification of the 
facts in dispute, taking into express account the deference afforded their 
client; and the ability to distinguish those issues of fact with those of law. 
Moreover, in performing the above analysis, students must be ever open to 
the argument that summary judgment indeed be granted in plaintiff’s favor, 
                                                 
43 See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, 
Ch. 802.02 (Mark S. Brodin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2018) (addressing significance of 
in-person appearance of witness before court and opposing party, under oath or affirmation, 
and subject to cross-examination). 
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1). 
45 In assessing whether movant has met the burden of demonstrating no genuine dispute of 
material fact, the court must assume all facts alleged by the non-moving party are true, and 
draw every reasonable inference in non-movant’s favor to determine the presence of 
outstanding factual issues. See, e.g., United States v. Bosurgi, 530 F.2d 1105 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
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founded upon law and fact,46 thereby potentially reversing the outcome by 
180 degrees. This analytic grasp from start to finish constitutes the 
paradigm for genuine substantive command of summary judgment 
problems in general, and further, opens the door to comprehension of the 
substantive role of procedure overall. 
 3. The Insight of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: 
Messages in a Bottle. Inherent in concurring and dissenting opinions is the 
very personification of critical thinking. These opinions oftentimes provide 
salient arguments and other details that the majority omits. They thereby 
provoke additional thought, and offer an insightful critique of the majority 
opinion, all of which increases the students’ own insight into the law. In 
these respects, the dissenting and concurring judges serve as built-in law 
professors, raising questions in the students’ minds about application of the 
law as if by Socratic method.  
 The dissenting or concurring opinion of one jurisdiction may later 
influence the law of another, or of the same court, thereby altering the 
course of precedent. So that, a poignant dissent written by Supreme Court 
Justice Holmes, in 1919, denouncing the majority for its failure to uphold 
the freedom of speech of political dissidents, now is considered to have 
“emphatically carried the day.”47 And the concurring opinion of Justice 
O’Connor, proposing a test for the constitutionality of religious displays on 
government property, is later embraced by Justice Blackman as a “sound 
analytical framework” within which to work in assessing the merits of a 
subsequent case.48 Dissenting and concurring opinions are indeed akin to 
messages in a bottle, engraving their transcendent, independent mark in the 
                                                 
46 Upon reasonable notice, a court may grant summary judgment in favor of the 
nonmovant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f)(1).  
47 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 442 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (addressing, 
generally, the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of coverage of the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech in the present day (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 
709, 728 (2012) (holding a conviction based upon a false claim of receipt of the 
Congressional Medal of Honor unconstitutional in violation of the free speech clause 
(citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting))).  
48 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
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law, with the potential to influence future cases and serve as impetus for 
legislative change.49 
 Students must understand that insight into the characteristics of 
dissenting and concurring opinions enables them to engage in a virtual 
polling of the individual judges on the panel. Students thereby can assess, 
based upon the content of all the judges’ respective opinions, how each 
member of the court might decide with a diverse set of facts at bar. Such 
diversity potentially changes the configuration of the panel, by bringing, for 
example, members of the earlier dissenting or concurring opinion over to 
the majority, or causing members of the earlier majority opinion to join with 
the dissent or concurrence,50 all based upon a previous imprimatur of 
thought carried through time. 
 4. The Precedential Effect of Dictum. Though not itself 
binding, dictum may constitute a forecast of subsequent application of the 
law, the very basis of analysis in a legal system founded on case precedent. 
A court’s articulation that it might decide another way tomorrow, with facts 
before it diverse from the ones that it has today, has potentially decisive 
significance in the disposition of a future case.51 The ability to recognize 
and apply such dictum lies at the foundation of competent lawyering. The 
                                                 
49 See People v. Owusu, 93 N.Y.2d 398, 414–15 (1999) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) 
(indicating the dissenting opinion to be the “standard mechanism” for bringing the majority 
opinion to the legislature’s attention “for amendatory consideration, if that [b]ranch of 
lawmaking government so desires”).  
50 See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 433 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (addressing a school 
speech case in which the Supreme Court held constitutional a public school suspension of a 
student for drug advocacy, based upon his display of a banner, which read “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS”). Justice Stevens, writing a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg joined, based his opinion, in part, on the language in question constituting a 
“nonsense message, not [drug] advocacy.” Id. at 444. How, one might pose to a class of 
law students, would the configuration of justices change, if at all, based upon a change in 
the precise nature of the speech at issue?  
51 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). Goss held a group of public high 
school students were entitled to minimum due process in a case involving suspensions of 
ten days or less. Id. at 580–81. In dictum, however, the Court expressly reserved opinion 
regarding, inter alia, “unusual situations,” or “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions for the 
remainder of the school term, or permanently . . . .” Id. at 584. All of which, it said, “may 
require more formal procedures.” Id. A professor might ask that students, relying 
exclusively on Goss, imagine a scenario in which they represent a client afforded only 
minimum due process, but subjected to a ten-day suspension encompassing an end-term 
exam period, or the last week of classes of the student’s senior year. The application of 
Goss to such fact patterns provides a fine lesson in the necessity of application of case law 
beyond the holding, in furtherance of effective legal representation. 
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appearance of dictum, however, may be exceedingly subtler, contained, for 
example, in the court’s choice of: a single word containing meaning broader 
than the facts before it; a word that itself triggers in the reader’s mind the 
precise antonym;52 a group of words; or a select juxtaposition of those 
words. Grasp of the varied ways in which dictum is expressed in case law, 
and how it is utilized in the analytic process, requires specific training, 
beyond mere recognition of the term. 
 5. The All-Encompassing Conceptual Framework: A 
Lawyer’s Vision. None of the above-stated analytic components, or any 
other, has cohesive meaning unless applied in the context of a conceptual 
framework dictated by the subject matter. Construction of that framework is 
not about form, but rather an identification of the governing law, and 
substantive comprehension of its inherent structure. Students must develop 
the ability to recognize the relevant conceptual framework, and understand 
how analysis must work within that framework and span its entirety. The 
framework may be the elements of a common law cause of action, or those 
of a statutory provision, and the common law the vehicle for interpretation 
and application of each element of that provision. There may be a 
constitutional standard that governs, and a test that determines satisfaction 
of that standard.53 In some instances, a straightforward framework may be 
lacking, in which case students must look beyond the articulation of prima 
facie elements, standards, tests, and the like, and toward the cumulative 
body of relevant law to glean a coherent analytic structure. This latter 
                                                 
52 See, e.g., People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 350 (1949). In Vollmer, the New York Court 
of Appeals rejected the prosecution’s argument that defendant’s use of his bare fists 
constituted assault with a “dangerous weapon.” Id.  In reaching its conclusion, however, 
the court stated that, by “dangerous weapon,” the law “means something quite different 
from the bare fist of an ordinary man.” Id. (emphasis added). Such choice of adjective later 
prompted another judge to observe, in a similar context, that “ordinary” itself invokes the 
precise opposite word, “extraordinary.” Owusu, 93 N.Y.2d at 398, 411 (Bellacosa, J., 
dissenting) (citing Vollmer, 299 N.Y. at 350). “If the Vollmer Court had intended to 
exclude the fists of any person,” Judge Bellacosa opined, “it would not have included the 
telling adjective.” Owusu, 93 N.Y.2d at 411 (emphasis by the court). Thus, Judge Bellacosa 
indicated, “ordinary,” by virtue of its very antonym, “leaves open the possibility” that the 
definition of “dangerous instrument” might encompass the fists of a “boxer” or “martial 
arts expert.” Id. 
53 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (stating the reasonableness of a 
seizure, under the Fourth Amendment, is determined by a balancing test between the right 
of the individual, on the one hand, and the governmental need to safeguard the public, on 
the other).   
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approach necessitates aggressive, sophisticated thinking on their part, and 
highlights even more the need for specialized analytic training.     
 In an analytic writing assignment, students’ mere identification of 
issues and accompanying case law holdings, or recitation of cases one after 
another, or diversion from the issues altogether, is per se symptomatic of an 
insufficient substantive identification and grasp of the relevant conceptual 
framework. Those students are thereby unable to conceive of the role that 
the issues and cases play in the context of the bigger picture. Without the 
ability to formulate a conceptual framework, students lack a genuine grasp 
of the law and its application. With this ability, students gradually develop 
the beginnings of a lawyer’s vision, whereby the experienced lawyer creates 
an instinctive, mental picture of the relevant framework, and how the other 
essential analytic components fit therein. 
 6. The Decisive Influence of Presumptions, Burdens, and 
Standards of Appellate Review. The elements of a conceptual framework 
do not function in a vacuum. Their application is necessarily influenced by 
other analytic concepts reflected in the common law, such as those 
addressed above,54 as well as those of presumption, burden of proof, and 
standard of appellate review. Individually, or in combination, these latter 
concepts effectively can impose the determining weight when applied to a 
given case. Their unique influence deserves isolated attention in the 
students’ education, as, in an advocacy context, arguments are readily made 
or broken based upon appreciation of where the weight lies. 
 For example, imagine a case addressing claimed government 
prohibition of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.55 The core 
conceptual framework that structures analysis of the issue includes two 
elements: (1) a government interest in prohibiting the speech; and (2) a 
prohibition tailored to that interest.56 The degree of legitimate interest the 
                                                 
54 See supra Section I(c)(1) – (5). 
55 Assume, for the sake of this hypothetical, that the speech does not lie within a category 
unprotected by the First Amendment, as defined by law. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (placing “defamation,” “obscenity,” and “fighting words” 
under that category) (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
56 See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 
(1983) (discussing varying levels of scrutiny, in terms of assessment of government interest 
and permissible scope of prohibition, in the context of diverse government forums). 
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government must demonstrate, and the tailoring required, are contingent 
upon the problem presented.57 
 Thus, suppose the prohibition allegedly restricts speech expressed in 
the context of a traditional public forum, and is allegedly content-based, 
thereby raising the presumption of unconstitutionality.58 This presumption 
imposes upon the government the “most rigorous burden of justification,”59 
if the prohibition is so much as afforded consideration at all.60  To meet that 
burden, the government must demonstrate a “compelling” interest, and the 
prohibition must be “narrowly drawn” in furtherance of that interest.61 
Students must be trained to look beyond a superficial articulation and 
perfunctory application of this presumption and concomitant burden. 
Specifically, imbedded in their thinking must be the recognition that the 
presumption, and burden it imposes upon the government, is a pivotal factor 
in determination of constitutionality.62 So that, in furtherance of meeting 
their burden, counsel for the government must engage in intrinsic contrast 
and comparison of the details of the case at bar with those of case 
precedent. Their goal is to establish, from the government’s perspective, 
where the common law would draw the line between constitutionality and 
unconstitutionality in the case at bar. Counsel for the speaker must be 
prepared to do likewise, establishing their own position of where the line is 
drawn.63 Training limited to spotting the issue and arriving at a blanket 
conclusion omits to lead students toward the requisite academic mastery 
essential to representation of the client. 
 Imagine, yet again, that a criminal defendant, on trial before a 
federal district court, objects to the prosecution’s introduction of spousal 
testimony, asserting the marital communications privilege. At issue is 
                                                 
57 See id. 
58 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (stating 
content-based prohibitions to be presumptively invalid).    
59 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 436 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
60 See Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (stating an ordinance that 
“slip[s] from the neutrality of time, place and circumstance into a concern about content” is 
“never permitted”) (internal quotes and citation omitted).  
61 Perry Educ. Ass’n., 460 U.S. at 45. 
62 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (survey indicating 
application of strict scrutiny “most fatal in free speech cases”). 
63 Rather than provide a precise definition of compelling interest, the Supreme Court has 
relegated determination to the courts on a factual basis. Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1070 n.9 (1998) (Beezer, J., dissenting). 
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whether defendant’s alleged communication was confidential.64 The 
prosecution claims that it was not, and thus the privilege inapplicable. 
Subsequent to evidentiary hearing, the judge concludes that defendant 
failed to meet the burden of proving confidentiality. The testimony is 
admitted. Defendant is found guilty of the crime in question. 
 On appeal, the sole issue is the admission of the spousal testimony. 
The appellate standard of review of the court’s ruling is abuse of 
discretion.65 Such standard has pivotal significance in favor of the 
prosecution, based upon the deference afforded to the lower court 
determination.66  Students, standing in the shoes of the prosecution, must, of 
course, so recognize, and argue accordingly. If the sole strategy of students 
representing defendant is to argue that the evidence presented warrants a 
diverse conclusion, with no specific effort to overcome the hurdle of 
deference, they are facing a heavy, uphill battle, which they are likely to 
lose. 
 Both sides need be aware of potential arguments that lie beneath the 
standard of appellate review,67 but nonetheless affect its application. Thus, 
students for defendant must not lose sight of the law that governs the lower 
court’s hand in making its determination in the first instance. They rather 
must assess the lower court’s application of that law in conjunction with the 
standard of appellate review. For example, the law presumes marital 
communications to be confidential, and the burden, at the lower court level, 
is upon the prosecution to rebut the presumption.68 The present hypothetical 
suggests that the court may have wrongly placed the initial burden on the 
defendant. One potential concern then becomes: Did the lower court 
commit an error of law by failing to recognize the presumption, and thus 
placed the burden on the wrong party? Moreover, in so doing, might the 
court have overlooked a lack of credible proof produced by the prosecution, 
thereby making a “clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence?”69 If 
                                                 
64 See generally United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729–30 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating the 
elements comprising the conceptual framework governing determination of the privilege). 
65 Id. at 729; United States v. Singleton, 260 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). 
66 Under an abuse of discretion standard, the district court determination is afforded “large 
latitude.” See Moran v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1984). 
67 See infra Section II(B)(1)(b) (addressing the need to develop a dimensional 
understanding of an appellate court decision). 
68 Marashi, 913 F.2d at 730. 
69 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (stating that a “district court 
would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law 
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defense counsel successfully so argues, that deference, otherwise readily 
afforded the lower court, is negated in its entirety, and the weight shifted in 
defendant’s favor.  
D.  Analysis and the Distillation Process: A Lawyer’s Poetry 
 The ultimate objective in analytic training is gradual focus on 
students’ ability to assimilate law into their own thinking, and apply that 
law in a manner that, though substantively inclusive, is seemingly simple in 
expression. True mastery of legal analysis is evidenced by text that is pure 
in both thought and presentation. Yet, by very reason of its unadulterated 
state, that text is, at the same time, densely potent. This distilled product is a 
lawyer’s poetry. 
 In the literary world, arguably the greatest poetry ever composed, 
instilling in our minds, hearts, and souls the most poignant and complex of 
ideas, itself often consists of the simplest expression of language and 
thought. This poetry is at once pure in its expression, yet potent in its 
content, undoubtedly owing to the relentless effort of the author in constant 
re-thinking and re-drafting.70  
 The road to a law student’s ability to achieve distillation in thought 
and expression is thus long. Students, at the onset of legal studies, are likely 
not even aware of such an intangible objective. This objective is made more 
formidable by the necessary technicalities, and overall difficulties, of legal 
study in the first instance. Students only can recognize and accomplish such 
objective over time, with experienced guidance throughout the process, 
consisting of intensive, repeated practice in a multitude of contexts. Even 
then, the road extends beyond the law school education into the professional 
world. The formal educational path to be paved along the way is addressed 
infra, from which the poet laureate ultimately shall emerge.  
                                                                                                                            
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence”); Singleton, 260 F.3d at 1301 (stating 
findings of fact underlying the determination of admission of evidence to be reviewed 
based on the standard of “clear error”). 
70 The recognition of the relationship between the concept of distillation and poetry is 
inherent in the very title prefacing a collection of poems by a late French author. See 
GUILLAUME APOLLINAIRE, ALCOOLS (1913), reprinted in, ALCOOLS: POEMS (Donald 
Revell trans., 1995). “Alcool” is the French word for “alcoholic beverage.” Alcool, 
LAROUSSE, FRENCH DICTIONARY (2011). Among alcoholic beverages are “distilled spirits,” 
which are purified after fermentation through a process called distillation. Alcoholic 
beverage, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/alcoholic-
beverage (last visited Feb. 9, 2019). They are hence, in their purified state, more potent in 
terms of alcoholic content. See id. 
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II. FROM THE SUPERIOR TO THE SUPERB 
A.  Unity of Thought and the Creation of Synergy 
 The question is then precisely how to enhance such a fine education 
as that currently provided in law school. Ideally, most, if not all, law school 
courses should be taught with increased, specific emphasis on analysis per 
se. As stated, time and the pressures of a voluminous syllabus often 
preclude the ideal in the context of the subject courses. Those professors 
that succeed in doing so nonetheless are to be profusely applauded, and 
those that do not must be encouraged to so strive. Undoubtedly, however, 
there are educators in law schools throughout the country placing supreme 
emphasis upon detailed analysis in whatever course they teach. At issue is 
the extent to which this education takes place, the development of analysis 
as a topic of study itself, and its overall open recognition in legal education. 
To effectuate the requisite change, therefore, every member of the legal 
profession must be enlightened to the cause!  
 Professors teaching the subject courses might devote at least one 
aspect of the students’ examination to a question that poses a hypothetical 
in a procedural context. This approach tests the students’ ability to 
understand just how the procedural context in which an issue arises affects 
its substantive disposition, instead of merely viewing all law in a vacuum. 
To take analysis yet one step further, a suggested examination model is as 
follows:  
Students attend the examination equipped with their basic 
knowledge acquired in the subject course, and are presented 
with a hypothetical consisting of particularized issues new to 
them. They also are given relevant cases with which they are 
unfamiliar, or excerpts thereof, to assist them in their 
assessment of the new, particularized issues. The students 
are then asked to apply the basic law they studied in class, in 
concert with the new, more specific cases decided under the 
law, to perform an analysis and arrive at a conclusion 
regarding the merits of a claim. 
 The above combined knowledge of the basic law, with that derived 
from newly researched cases on point, forms the very basis of an attorney’s 
analysis of the merits of a case: a method simple in approach, yet profound 
in substance. The suggested examination therefore provides an excellent 
forum to test the true depths of students’ understanding of the law studied in 
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class, and their ability to stretch that understanding, in a new, wholly 
substantive, analytic context. Most important, it signals to the students the 
degree to which analysis plays a role in furtherance of their developing the 
abilities of a practitioner. 
 Professors teaching the subject courses, and those teaching analytic 
doctrine, should confer wherever advantageous to coordinate aspects of law 
and thought. They thereby create a conceptual unity among all the courses 
offered, to the extent practicable, in furtherance of that synergy of learning 
so necessary to the development of a complete legal mind. Just as analytic 
doctrine is central to every law school course, so too is every law school 
professor, to whom a student is entrusted, a permanent part of what should 
be the student’s one, cohesive, education experience. 
 One means of coordination is for the professor teaching analytic 
doctrine to isolate a general topic that is the object of instruction in one of 
the subject courses. Then, in drafting a hypothetical, that professor focuses 
on a more specific issue, within that general topic, not covered in the 
subject course. Students are then required to research and perform a written 
analysis focusing on that isolated issue. In this manner, students have an 
opportunity to experience analysis of a specific issue, presented in one 
course, but in the context of the bigger picture, presented in the other, and 
be the better for it, in both courses. Students, however, only benefit in this 
regard if both professors, though acting independently, communicate with 
one another and are each aware of the other’s instructional focus at a given 
time.  From this awareness, a unity of discourse may evolve naturally 
between the two classes, involving students and professors alike, thereby 
creating the synergy. All that is required is openness of mind. 
B.  Specialized Analytic Training: First Year and Beyond 
 1. The Model Beginning. A legal writing course presents the 
natural model for specialized, professional analytic training, throughout the 
first year up to graduation. Its potential lies in a structure consisting of 
frequent, varied, and increasingly complex, written assignments, required 
throughout the year. In the context of these assignments, class lectures must 
provide intense instruction in analytic concepts and their significance. 
Additionally, discourse between students and professor must evolve with a 
view toward challenging students’ analytic abilities. The purpose of this 
discourse is to both enforce what they have learned, and ever carry those 
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abilities upward toward the next assignment and beyond, always with the 
professional standard in sight. 
 Schools, however, must robustly acknowledge the central role of 
such course, and thereby convey to students the appropriate message 
regarding the weight it carries in their education. Unfortunately, the word 
“writing” is often misinterpreted. It suggests a course about form. Writing is 
certainly essential, as, in performing the task of expression, students gain 
further insight into analysis and the subject before them. Of course, they 
also remain with a documentation of their thinking. But that is just it: it’s 
about thinking as a lawyer. The structure of a discussion section of an 
informational memorandum of law or an argument section of an appellate 
brief, the basic documents drafted in a legal writing course, is far less about 
superficial appearance and organization as it is about an intrinsic grasp of 
the underlying workings of the law. Without such grasp, how are students 
to: identify the conceptual framework that governs the overall structure of 
their analysis; isolate the legal foundation that dictates the paragraphs 
contained within that framework; articulate the pertinent analytic 
components of supporting authority; and assess the significance of those 
components to the facts of their case, while arriving at conclusions each 
step of the way. Such is the general, core structure of legal writing, which, 
by very necessity, is rooted in substantive thinking in furtherance of the 
intrinsic case law analysis demanded in the practice of law. Very rarely, 
when a student approaches this author with a question about form, in any 
educational context, is it not instead purely and profoundly about substance. 
Failure to so recognize leaves the student’s question unanswered. 
 a. First Semester: The Professional Groundwork. There is 
extraordinary potential for enhanced development of analytic thinking in the 
first semester legal writing course alone. Students learn the most when 
professors stretch their inventiveness to the limits. To accomplish an in-
depth understanding of the aspects of any analytic component of case law, 
one suggestion, as stated, is that individual writing assignments be designed 
to create a select emphasis on one or two analytic components at a time. 
One assignment may involve a hypothetical necessitating focus upon the 
role of the underlying reasoning of a statute, and its significance to statutory 
interpretation. Another may focus upon the recognition of dictum contained 
in a United States Supreme Court opinion, and how that dictum may 
influence the outcome of a future case. Students’ analytic journey might 
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require that they study the lower court decision that underlies an appellate 
opinion on point, to open their minds to procedure and the insight acquired 
in learning the entire history of a case. Imagination in the creation of 
assignments is often the best educator. 
 b. Second Semester: Advocacy as Multi-Dimensional 
Substantive Training. The second-semester appellate brief assignment 
represents, in many respects, the culmination of all analytic training the 
students have had for the year, in all courses. It thus occupies a position of 
great prominence among requirements of the first year. This assignment 
generally involves a confluence of two or more of the subject courses, 
procedure necessarily being one of them; however, a detailed, more 
sophisticated focus on isolated aspects of those subjects is required to 
advance an argument. Even oral argument, the culmination of the appellate 
brief assignment, represents so much more than just the formalities of 
addressing the court. It rather is a discourse focused on the distilled, pivotal 
issues of the case in controversy. This discourse is necessarily conducted 
between lawyers: the judge or panel of judges, on the one side, and the 
advocates on the other. Thus, in mock oral argument, analytic concepts, 
studied year-long, are embodied in the questions from the bench, and the 
responses from the student-advocates. Such concepts become personified in 
the minds of the students, leaving an indelible mark in their memory.  
 Additionally, in assuming the role of advocate themselves, students 
acquire a first-hand grasp of the textured substance underlying appellate 
court decisions, which largely constitute the class reading assignments 
throughout their law school experience. This grasp includes an insightful 
appreciation of the lower court determination underlying that of an appellate 
court, and how both lower court and appellate decisions are the product of a 
dynamic of thought, created by judge and advocates working within an 
adversary system. Students thus view the arguments of both sides submitted 
to the appellate court, the lower court decision, and the law that governed 
that decision, as all having a life of their own. They no longer regard the 
case book decisions that they read each day as two-dimensional writings, 
but rather the multi-dimensional documents they are meant to represent in 
the law. Such, in part, is why additional instruction in analysis, from an 
advocacy perspective, is required beyond the first year: to re-enforce that 
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multi-dimensional insight, and expand upon it.71 Most crucial, over time, 
students come to appreciate that, as advocates, they are an impetus for 
growth in the law. By advising the panel of judges of their position, in their 
role as officers of the court, advocates influence judicial decisions in a way 
that ultimately may change the tide of precedent. The better the advocate’s 
analytic abilities, and consciousness of the gravity of that role, the 
potentially wiser and more responsible the influence.72  
 It is thus essential, based upon the sterling significance of the 
appellate brief assignment, that ample time be devoted to one-on-one 
analytic discourse between professor and student to open the student’s mind 
to the multi-dimensionality of the law, both in the context of the specific 
moot court problem before them, and all other aspects of their legal study. 
Here is where the professor’s assumption of the role of senior partner, 
providing a guiding legal hand, and, at the same time, playing devil’s 
advocate, is the most critical; and where the discourse between professor 
and student evolves into the professional. 
 2. Every Step Thereafter. To lay the optimum analytic 
foundation for students’ entry into the legal profession, courses devoted to 
analysis per se must be developed and incorporated into the remainder of 
the law school curriculum. To the extent practicable, they should be 
mandatory to afford each student the same advanced training. Without 
reinforcement and development of the analytic instruction conducted in the 
first year, a significant portion of students’ first-year training fades from 
memory, and their ability to attain the optimum advancement in analytic 
thinking, which academia has the unique potential to offer, is far less.  
 Courses that follow the first year should enhance upon the first-year 
model, gradually tailored to students’ continual advancement, but otherwise 
varied based upon the individual professor’s creativity. A syllabus may 
include, for example, more complex legal topics. As analysis transcends 
topic boundaries, the professor is not limited to one subject, but can pick 
and choose among unique and thought-provoking aspects of a multitude of 
subjects. Indeed, repeated practice in the application of analytic concepts, 
but in the context of constantly diverse topics, better assists students in their 
grasp of those concepts. The advantage of diversity is that, with each new 
                                                 
71 See infra Section II(B)(2) (discussing instruction beyond year one). 
72 See infra Section III(B) (discussing the role of analytic training in development of 
maturity in judgment and ethics). 
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assignment, students bring to the table abstractions with which they are 
already familiar, but are presented with a topic that provides a fresh insight 
into application of those abstractions. This advantage is present in the first 
year as well, but becomes increasingly more beneficial as students advance, 
for they have increased knowledge and experience upon which to build, 
while the foundation laid in the first year is yet fresh in their minds. The 
opportunity to build, and build, upon excellence is why continued 
instruction in analytic doctrine is so important each year of the law school 
education.  
 The professor also may direct, in the context of an advocacy 
assignment, that students take the side of defendant, and then switch over to 
plaintiff, and then assume the role of judge. The assumption of diverse 
roles, but in the context of the same problem, teaches students first hand 
that attorneys’ substantive command of their own position is dependent 
upon a comparable command of that of their adversary. Moreover, in 
embracing the perspective of judge, the bird’s eye view, they can better 
recognize the relevant merits and flaws of both sides, and the distilled, 
pivotal issues hanging in the balance. As judge, they also experience 
directly the substantial influence of advocates in the decision-making 
process. Thus, students’ understanding is turned inside out, backwards, 
forwards, upside down, and sideways, and thinking as a lawyer, with all the 
layered complexities that entails, begins to feel like second nature.       
 Analysis is by no means limited to the litigation context. 
Assignments can be created to dissect the role of analysis in, for example, 
creating a will, drafting and negotiating a contract, taking a deposition, or 
defending one. The express expansion of analysis to all lawyerly tasks 
instills in the minds of soon-to-be graduates an all-encompassing 
appreciation of the level of requisite thinking that is right on target with the 
practice of law. 
 Class discourse on the inner-workings of the pertinent law and each 
student’s role in drafting the assignment continues to be of profound 
significance. Moreover, individual student-professor conferences, at this 
advanced stage of learning, not only enforce students’ grasp of the 
assignment, but provide an opportunity to guide students in charting their 
own analytic path in reaching a conclusion. No one written analysis, though 
based upon the precise same law and facts, is identical to any other, nor 
should it be. From individuality comes increased insight, which leads to 
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enhancement of the living law. One-on-one conferences therefore assist 
students in honing their own, unique imagination as lawyers. They thereby 
recognize themselves capable, not only of grasping the law presented, but 
reaching beyond the basic understanding of analysis acquired in the first 
year, into the depths of independent thinking. That same imagination that 
makes the best educators, also makes the best practitioners, judges, and 
overall leaders.  
 When students begin their work in the profession, they may be 
fortunate enough to have a superior with the willingness, and sparing 
amount of time, to guide them analytically in their maturity as lawyers, or 
they may not be so fortunate. Even directors of law school clinics, which 
provide valuable instruction in many aspects of legal representation, likely 
find themselves in a position similar to that of the busy practitioner and 
jurist. Their primary concern is producing work and meeting deadlines, in 
furtherance of serving the public. Under such circumstances, there is little 
opportunity to provide the analytic instruction available in a purely 
scholastic environment. Students thus need at least to experience that 
instructional relationship in the formal law school context, with a professor 
in that role of senior partner, as long as possible. To the extent such 
mentorship is absent from their professional work environment, they may 
draw from that optimal, in-school experience to stand them in good stead.     
III. BENEFITS TO THE PROFESSION 
A.  The Passion of the Living Law 
 Aside from the fact that instruction in analytic doctrine releases 
better academically trained lawyers into the world, it also serves yet greater, 
more poignant purposes to the profession as a whole. For one, education in 
analytic doctrine promotes passionate thinking at the onset of a lawyer’s 
career, an attribute essential in every profession. Students must be mindful 
that, underlying the court decisions that have shaped the image of justice in 
this country, are likely briefs submitted by counsel with sensitivity to 
common law analysis in a manner leaps and bounds beyond a definitional 
knowledge and reflex application. Analytic training potentially opens our 
minds to a heart-felt vision of not just what the law is, but what it could be, 
for the benefit of our society. Such is what the concept of the living law is 
all about. 
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B.  Maturity and Ethics 
 The most important aspect of analytic doctrine is that it provides a 
significant medium for the development of the maturity in judgment and 
legal ethics essential to every individual entering the profession. No young 
person, no matter how serious-minded and conscientious, enters law school 
fully grasping the weightiness of the responsibility of providing legal 
representation to another human being.73 That level of maturity is acquired 
over time, if at all, and only with the fullest of instruction. Pronounced 
training in analysis assists students in recognizing the various legal 
positions they may embrace on behalf of a client, and choosing the ones 
most viable from the perspective of technical knowledge, strategy, and 
justice. Most significant, however, they must learn that there are some 
arguments that they are obliged to recognize as lawyers, within ethical 
boundaries, in furtherance of competent representation. Such recognition is 
required regardless of whether they are on what they perceive to be the 
winning side or losing side of a case, and is essential to the function of our 
adversarial system. 
 This training in professional responsibility applies to all lawyerly 
occupations. There is no area within the vast confines of the legal 
profession that does not require the sensitivity to right and wrong, and to 
lawyerly purpose, that analytic doctrine assists in cultivating. Students must 
be presented with the reality of the all-encompassing obligation they face, 
in furtherance of developing the character and fitness that is the key to 
entrance into the practice of law. Thus, instruction in analytic doctrine 
opens an avenue of necessary learning that might otherwise only be 
addressed tangentially, and not in the repeated context of actual substance, 
as all legal education must be.  
CONCLUSION 
 Contrary to what the title of this paper suggests, the consummate 
legal education is not achieved in any law school, regardless of how fine the 
curriculum, as that curriculum already is, or as it could be. As lawyers, not 
only do we teach from the perspective of the learner, we are necessarily 
learners ourselves all our professional lives, in our never-ending pursuit of 
                                                 
73 See supra Section II(B)(2) (regarding the ethical responsibility of advocates as impetus 
for change in the law).  
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command of the law. Such pursuit is what makes this profession so 
challenging and so fulfilling to so many, and the passion that is the impetus 
for that pursuit of knowledge benefits society-at-large. 
 The enhanced analytic training pronounced herein, however, 
provides the future generation of lawyers with a stronger lawyerly 
foundation, enabling them to strive all the better in that eternal quest for the 
consummate legal education, and to convey their superior abilities to 
generations that follow. Consequently, the legal profession itself benefits 
further in the process, and so too the public that it serves each day. The 
quality of that service must be, after all, the ultimate concern of every law 
school. Academic acumen, that passion for the law, maturity, and ethics, 
attributes essential for entrance into this profession, are all emboldened by 
improved emphasis upon the analytic core of legal education. 
 To provide such lawyerly foundation, we must bridge the antiquated 
rift between the law school institution and the practicing bar, to the extent 
that rift prohibits the student’s access to the full breadth and depth of 
analytic training. In eliminating this rift, we elevate the analytic discourse to 
its optimum level, and thereby build upon the foundation that Christopher 
Langdell laid when he showcased an approach to teaching law all those 
years ago. Thus, the enhancement of the role of analysis within the law 
school curriculum is not merely a hypothetical means of legal education, 
nor is it an alternate means; it rather lies at the very heart of the case law 
method, and most important, paves the life-long path of a lawyer.   
